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THE ARMY RESERVE: RELEVANT TODAY, MORE RELEVANT TOMORROW
personnel came from the Army Reserve. 3 In World War II, the Army Reserve significantly contributed to enlargement of the army with the mobilization of 1940 after the attack on Pearl
Harbor. The Army Reserve again contributed sizeable forces to fight alongside the active duty forces and participated in the many campaigns along the way.
After North Korean forces crossed the 38 th Parallel in 1950, the Army Reserve was extensively used in the Korean War. In fact, the Army Reserve provided 971 units which comprised over 200,000 soldiers for the Korean War. 4 Although the Korean War was shorter in duration than both World Wars, the large-scale use of Army Reserve forces reinforced the requirement to have a strong standing force in reserve. After each of the three major conflicts in the first half of the 20 th century, the Army Reserve reverted to a smaller force, and the soldiers returned to their civilian lives. Having participated in three major wars in the 20 th century, it appeared routine for the reserves to augment the active component during large-scale conflict.
That would not be the case with the next conflict the Army became engaged in, the Viet Nam War, which saw only a limited mobilization of the Army Reserve.
The Viet Nam War changed the paradigm of how wars would be fought using the Reserve
Components in this country. The war was similar to previous conflicts in that it was a protracted war that required a large active force, but dissimilar in that it lasted longer than the previous wars of the 20 th Century. "It took three years after the commitment of major combat units in Viet were openly critical of the agreement and felt it undermined the Army Reserve. 17 The criticism did not forestall progress and the additional focus and funding for the Army Reserve allowed its strategy to build trained units able to be alerted to report to a mobilization station for additional training prior to being deployed. The strategy, known as "alert-mobilize-train-deploy," became "doctrine" and provided a basis to better plan unit functions such as training and administration.
It also focused efforts to maximize readiness during inactive duty training assemblies and annual training. The CAPSTONE Program was further revised and updated in 1994 to provide units with detailed information concerning their wartime mission. 18 The WARTRACE Program, as it evolved into its most current form, became the "deliberate alignment of Army Forces under specified wartime commanders in order to conduct wartime planning in support of U.S. national military strategic strategy." 19 The Asia, or had affiliations with other active component units that were deployed to Saudi Arabia were not called up or mobilized for duty. 24 There was a clear demonstration that the Total Force policy did not work as it was planned.
There were also other aspects of the Total Force policy that also did not function well.
Although Army Reserve units that were aligned or identified to a Southwest Asia commitment had developed post-mobilization training plans, the training plans were often changed so unit training could be accelerated and deployment expedited. Yet other units that were identified, but did not have the requisite personnel readiness to deploy, had soldiers cross-leveled into the unit to make its personnel readiness acceptable. 25 Other units that had personnel and/or equipment shortages were fixed at the mobilization stations, which had been part of the plan all "Since 1990, the Army has relied more and more on the reserve components to meet demanding mission requirements in support of the National Military Strategy (NMS). 29 Likewise, the Army Reserve's unique capabilities almost guarantee a call-up in times of crisis due to its specialties (see figure 2) . But the change in structure and focus was not enough to stand the next test of the Total Force. uncertain overseas deployment requirements." 31 As a result, the mobilization process was modified to better tailor requirements to the situation. Whereas in the past a TPFFD would be the catalyst for a unit to alert, mobilize, train, and deploy, the Request for Forces (RFF) became the standard for requesting capabilities for mobilization and deployment.
The process of requesting a certain capability via RFF is more precise in articulating exact requirements for a given situation than the TPFFD ever was. While the TPFFD drove the delivery of certain capabilities to the battlefield, the TPFFD was not necessarily tailored to a specific requirement and the "one size fits all" approach resulted. However, a problem arises for the RFF when in a crisis mode and a hasty, rather than a deliberate, mission analysis results in the drafting of a tailored requirement (RFF) that could either overestimate or underestimate the requisite force for the mission. The result is the mobilization of forces for a mission that may or may not require all the capabilities delivered. The time to go back and ask for additional forces, remission forces, or return forces for demobilization also has negative implications and can be very time consuming. However, one must be concerned about bringing persons with various backgrounds, skillsets, and the like together and hastily mobilizing and deploying them into a combat zone.
The increased cross-leveling of personnel has naturally resulted in closer scrutiny and validation at the mobilization station for deployment abroad. While RC units are generally more cohesive due to their links to communities and personnel that stay in an unit due to its location, the mass transferring of personnel from throughout the Army Reserve to fill shortages has created cohesion and communications problems for deploying units. Fortunately, the Army has now been able to adapt the mobilization process to provide the time for units (and individuals)
that have been brought together from various parts of the country to work and train together before reporting to the mobilization station and deploying into harm's way. But all is not perfect with the mobilization process.
Overall, the Army Reserve has done well in the second test of the Total Force Policy.
Admittedly, there have been challenges regarding the mobilization process, but when called, the Army Reserve provided the trained personnel and units to complement the active force. Still, now is the time for the Army Reserve to change to be "more ready" and make it a more responsive contributor to the Total Force.
The Army Reserve Expeditionary Force
Like the active Army, the Army Reserve is currently "transforming" to an Expeditionary
Force that complements the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model and complies with transformation initiatives of the Joint Force and current National Military Strategy (NMS). 32 The
Army Reserve Expeditionary Force (AREF) will be a modular force that is tailored (packaged) for missions to ensure that the right size and type forces are ready, properly equipped with current state-of-the-art equipment, and can deploy with minimal delay. Once fully implemented, the AREF concept will allow the Army Reserve to train, equip, and mobilize its forces in a higher state of readiness and more efficient manner than in its history. Funding will be programmed and provided to units for personnel training. Equipment will be based on established timelines as set forth in the AFORGEN model which will develop forces in three pools. 33 The first pool is the Reset/Train Pool. Units in this pool will remain here for up to three years as they transition from deployment or are short personnel or equipment which renders the unit less than ready in a C4 or C5 status. While assigned to the Reset/Train Pool, a graduated approach to improvement will be implemented. Year one of the model will focus on individual skills. In year two the level of training increases to smaller scale collective training at the squad or crew level. Culmination in this pool is in year three of the cycle with an external evaluation and certification at the company/team level in a Army Reserve Warrior Exercise. Upon successful completion of the three years in this pool, forces are moved into the next pool, the Ready Pool.
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The Ready Pool is the second of the three pools and is a one year period from beginning to end. This phase of ARFORGEN capitalizes on the successes of the first pool and builds upon it with a battalion or company external evaluation. The external evaluation will be conducted by one of the Combat Training Centers and will provide validation and the authority to move the unit into the Available Pool. Program. 38 All are making contributions to change the culture of the Army Reserve to a warrior based soldier who is part of a vital team.
The TTHS account has been available to the active component for years, but was not available to the reserve components until recently. The lack of a TTHS account degraded unit readiness and was a training detractor because commanders not only had to develop realistic training for duty qualified personnel, but also had to keep the non-qualified soldiers engaged as well. The TTHS account will assign all soldiers to the account in one of the TTHS categories and the soldiers will not be placed in a unit until he/she is military occupational specialty qualified. This burden will now be handled by a central body away from the AREF. 39 Reengineering the mobilization process began shortly after September 11 th . It became readily apparent that the way the Total Force Policy intended Reserves would be called up via
TPFFDs would not work in the future. Therefore, in order to ensure personnel were trained, the training model had to change. The Army Reserve is currently working to transition to the TrainMobilize-Deploy concept. 40 This process will fully support the AREF concept.
Refocusing command and control, as well as correcting structure, required a thorough analysis of future requirements and what was unnecessary to build and support the AREF. The current 10 RRCs will be disestablished and four new Regional Readiness Sustainment
Commands will be created as well as other functional and operational commands established to synergistically improve readiness and responsiveness. The new functional and operational commands can focus energies on improving readiness of low-density high-skilled soldiers and ensure they are adequately sourced for success.
Lastly, the Army Reserve is leaning forward to adapt to the AREF concept. Army Reserve training strategy disseminated to the USARC's leadership this past year reflected the new "trainalert-deploy" model required of the AREF, as well as set the tone for the requisite culture change to train warriors. 41 Embedded in the strategy are key imperatives regarding the Warrior Ethos and Leading soldiers to be "ready now." The training strategy will prepare units to be added to the ARFORGEN pool. But even if the units are ready to deploy, the authority to mobilize the forces must be in place.
Current Mobilization Authorities
Both the President and Congress clearly have authority vested in law that enables either to mobilize forces for national emergencies or war. However, there are limitations and second, third, and perhaps many additional effects to which mobilization authority is used in response to the emergency. Regardless of the emergency, the Army Reserve must be better organized and prepared to respond to the emergency and maximize results out of the mobilization period.
Perhaps part of the problem is the current mobilization authorities and limitations.
Title 10, United States Code, Sections 12301, 12302, and 12304 grant the President and Congress certain authorities for mobilizing reserve forces. 42 Each of the sections pertaining to mobilization of Title 10 has a specific purpose and intent, with implications for the armed forces, the nation, and perhaps the world. Freedom. In the past, the Army Reserve had time to prepare its forces after alert to prepare for deployment. In the future, the alert to deployment timeline will be reduced significantly. The
Army Reserve is leaning forward with the transformation to the AREF which will make the Army
Reserve of tomorrow even more relevant to the Army than it is today.
